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John S. Dufªeld
Theo Farrell
Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Richard Price
Realism in Security Studies Michael C. Desch

To the Editors (John S. Dufªeld writes):
Michael Desch’s survey and critique of the new cultural literature in security studies is
a welcome addition to the debate about the potential contributions of this research
program to the problem of explaining state behavior in the realm of international
relations.1 At a minimum, his article should prompt culturalists to make greater efforts
to deªne their terms as well as to clarify what they have in common and how their
individual approaches differ. Nevertheless, Desch’s analysis is marred by six ºaws that
undermine his contention that “the best case that can be made for these new cultural
theories is that they are sometimes useful as a supplement to realist theories” (p. 142).
First, Desch mischaracterizes the issues at stake in the debate between realism and
culturalism. He repeatedly describes the crucial question as “whether these new theories merely supplement realist theories or actually threaten to supplant them” (pp. 141,
pp. 143, 144). This dichotomous characterization, however, needlessly oversimpliªes
and distorts the debate, because one can easily imagine a variety of other possible
relationships between culturalism and realism. One equally plausible alternative is that
neither approach is in any sense superior, but that both may be indispensable to any
fully satisfactory understanding of security affairs.
Second, Desch employs a double standard in assessing the relative merits of cultural
and realist approaches, one that necessarily skews the outcome in favor of realism. He
argues that “to make the case that cultural theories should supplant realist theories, the
new culturalists would have to demonstrate that their theories outperform realist
theories in ‘hard cases’ for cultural theories” (p. 144). If we are to have conªdence in
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his claims about the superiority of realism, however, we must hold it up to the same
standard, demonstrating that realist theories consistently outperform their culturalist
counterparts in what are hard cases for the former. In fact, Desch later admits the need
to employ a more symmetrical methodology for comparing the merits of culturalism
and realism when he invokes Imre Lakatos’s “three-cornered ªght” (p. 158).
Third, Desch’s conception of realism is so broad that it obscures what is distinctive
about the term and renders comparisons with other approaches problematic. Although
he does not explicitly deªne realism, Desch suggests that the common denominator of
realist theories is an emphasis on material factors (pp. 155–156). Yet two of the speciªc
approaches that he includes within the realist research program, organization theory
and traditional realism, do not clearly meet even this minimal requirement. Even
noncultural strands of organization theory tend to emphasize the rule-determined
structures and processes of organizations rather than factors that are indisputably
material in nature. As a result, not surprisingly, scholars have often regarded organization theory as a fundamental alternative to central variants of realism, such as
balance-of-power theory.2 Likewise, Desch’s passing reference to traditional realism’s
attention to “other domestic factors such as human nature” (p. 156) does little to bound
the concept, and realism certainly has no monopoly on the use of human nature to
explain international relations. Finally, Desch’s characterization of the work of Randall
Schweller as realist (p. 144) may not be controversial. Yet Schweller’s emphasis on
interests immediately raises the question of the sources of status quo and revisionist
preferences, a question for which culturalist theories may be well suited for providing
answers. Beyond the obvious deªnitional problems that it poses, the expansive nature
of Desch’s conceptualization of realism greatly complicates the task of assessing the
relative merits of the realist and cultural approaches, especially where it risks making
the two indistinguishable.
A fourth ºaw concerns that portion of Desch’s analysis devoted to describing three
potential challenges to testing the explanatory power of culturalist theories. In fact,
these challenges are exaggerated, especially insofar as they are no less true of many
strands of realism.3 Desch ªrst argues that “cultural variables are sometimes hard to
clearly deªne and operationalize” (p. 150). I agree, but the problem is equally true of
many of the variables emphasized in realism.4 For example, Kenneth Waltz, in his
seminal exposition of neorealist theory, deªnes capabilities to include population, size
of territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence––none of which is singled out as most important. Surely, at least
several of these elements, not to mention the lack of any hierarchy among them, pose
2. Barry Posen, for one, describes organization theory and balance-of-power theory as “two
distinct perspectives on state behavior.” See Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain,
and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 34. Scott Sagan
draws a similar distinction in Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation,” International Security, Vol. 18,
No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 66–107.
3. Desch recognizes that realism is equally subject to his third challenge, which stems precisely
from the broad nature of the culturalist and realist research programs as he deªnes them (pp.
155–157). Consequently, only the ªrst and second challenges will be addressed here.
4. For a more extensive discussion, see William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and
Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
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problems of deªnition, operationalization, and, ultimately, comparison, as Waltz himself acknowledges.5 Hans Morgenthau’s conception of power is even more problematic,
including as it does factors such as national character and national morale, which in
any case verge perilously close to the cultural.6 And even when assessments of capabilities are strictly limited to easily measurable material factors, realists may arrive at
different conclusions.7 In fact, Desch concedes in the end that his characterization of
the challenge to cultural theories may be overstated: “The deªnitional problem, however, is largely one of application rather than principle, because it is possible to clearly
deªne and operationalize culture” (p. 152).
The second challenge that Desch identiªes is what he terms the “sui generis problem”
(pp. 152–155). He notes that “some new culturalists in security studies focus on the
particulars of single cases, rather than on factors common to a number of cases, because
they assume that each one is sui generis.” This tendency, he argues, makes generalizations difªcult because it often produces cases that challenge the “unit homogeneity
assumption,” which holds, in Desch’s words, “that cases have enough meaningful
similarities to be comparable” (p. 152). Likewise, it means that these culturalists may
“have few, if any, systematic elements on which to build their theories,” and “without
systematic variables, there is no prediction” (p. 153).
This time, Desch offers no last-minute concession, but once again, he greatly exaggerates the challenge. Cultural theories are not inherently limited to emphasizing the
uniqueness of cases. Many elements of culture can vary systematically along welldeªned dimensions and thus lend themselves to cross-case measurement and comparison. A good example is Iain Johnston’s three-dimensional conceptualization of strategic
culture.8 In addition, there is no inherent reason why one cannot make testable predictions on the basis of sui generis cultures. The only requirement is that they have
observable behavioral implications. Nor do sui generis characterizations of cultures
necessarily violate the unit homogeneity assumption; what matters is that other characteristics of the units under consideration be similar across cases.9 Finally, the problem
is also true of realism insofar as some possible indicators of capabilities do not lend
themselves to easy measurement and comparison, as noted above.
Fifth, Desch underestimates the theoretical signiªcance of the case studies that
culturalists have conducted. One of his central arguments is that “[cultural] theories,
by themselves, do not provide much additional explanatory power beyond existing

5. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 131.
6. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York:
Knopf, 1967).
7. For example, whereas scholars have traditionally numbered Britain, France, and Japan among
the great powers of the interwar period, Randall L. Schweller draws a sharp distinction between
them and the three “poles” of the system, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Germany, in
Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1
(March 1993), pp. 73–103.
8. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4
(Spring 1995), pp. 32–64.
9. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientiªc Inference in
Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 91–94.
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theories” (p. 158). In his view, the recent culturalism has “selected cases that do not
provide crucial tests that enable us to distinguish which theories are better” (p. 170).
I agree with Desch that some, although not all, of the new cultural literature consists
of most likely, indistinguishable, and even disputable cases. Nevertheless, even most
likely and indistinguishable cases are useful for establishing the plausibility of cultural
theories, which is a necessary ªrst step in the process of theory testing and development.10 Moreover, the success of cultural theories in most likely cases can be read as
the failure of realist theories to explain what for them are hard tests or least likely cases.
Thus the subtext of Desch’s discussion of most likely cases is that realism cannot itself
pass the test that he has erected for culturalism.
In addition, cultural theories have held up well in at least two hard cases, those of
postwar, and especially post–Cold War, Germany and Japan. Arguably, these cases pose
serious puzzles for realist theory, given that much less change has occurred in the
security policies of those states following the end of the Cold War than important
strands of realism would predict. Certainly, neorealists began to anticipate as early as
1990 that both Germany and Japan would seek to acquire nuclear weapons, something
that neither has done thus far.11 Instead, the policies they have actually pursued may
be better explained in terms of their political cultures.12
Signiªcantly, Desch does not deny that these are potentially hard cases, but he terms
them premature. This characterization is highly troublesome, however, for it includes
no indication of just how long we must wait to be able to draw deªnitive theoretical
conclusions. And even if a longer waiting period is warranted, it would raise serious
questions about the utility of realism, questions that should be particularly troubling
for Desch given his avowed concern that theories lend themselves to prediction (see,
e.g., p. 153).
In fact, Desch largely sidesteps the issue by focusing on the cultures themselves
rather than on their effects on national security policy. I do not deny that culture may
have international structural origins, as he argues. But the critical issue here is whether
a culture, once it comes into existence, can have an important independent inºuence
on state behavior, an inºuence that should become especially evident when structural
variables change. The German and Japanese cases suggest strongly that it can.
Finally, if the studies that culturalists have conducted do not meet his standards,
Desch ought to suggest just what cases would be hard ones for cultural theories. And
if none can be identiªed, what does this mean for the enterprise of theory testing?

10. Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson
W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Volume 7, Strategies of Inquiry (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 108–109.
11. John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International
Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Summer 1990), pp. 5–56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure
of International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44–79.
12. See especially Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and
Japan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and John S. Dufªeld, World Power
Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Uniªcation
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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Presumably, it would be all the more important to ascertain whether realism can
outperform culturalism in what are least likely cases for the former.
Sixth, and perhaps most seriously, Desch concedes the potential usefulness of cultural
theories in so many circumstances that one cannot help but wonder whether they in
fact represent a more promising explanatory point of departure than does realism. He
ªrst suggests that realism applies primarily to great powers (p. 159) and to situations
where a state’s security, and secondarily its economic, interests are at stake (p. 160). He
then explicitly concedes three circumstances in which cultural theories may provide
better explanations: when there is a lag between structural change and alterations in
state behavior, when states act contrary to structural imperatives, and when structure
is indeterminate.
These concessions greatly undermine Desch’s thesis. Certainly, the occasional occurrence of brief lags would not pose a major challenge to realist theory. But if they take
place with great frequency, arguably no theory of state behavior would be complete if
it failed to include the causes of such lags, be they cultural or otherwise. And if a lag
lasts long enough, its explanation presumably becomes at least as important as that of
any eventual behavioral change. In the cases of post–Cold War Germany and Japan,
the lags are now approaching an entire decade. Surely, if realism is to be of any policy
relevance, it must be able to predict the timing of change with more accuracy than that.
In addition, situations involving behavior contrary to structural imperatives or structural indeterminacy appear to be quite common. Empirical anomalies of this nature
have often served as the starting point for culturalist and other nonrealist analyses.13
Moreover, and contrary to Desch’s claim that “realists maintain that structure is frequently determinate” (p. 168), many scholars working under the realist banner have
found it necessary to introduce nonstructural variables of an ideational nature (perceptions, beliefs, interests, etc.) to account for important international phenomena.14 Even
Waltz is quite explicit about the limited ability of structural theory to explain state
behavior.15
After reading “Culture Clash,” it is difªcult not to conclude that, more often than
not, the situations of interest to students of international relations are likely to be better
explained by cultural factors. Consequently, a superior approach to understanding state
behavior might be to start with cultural variables and then to invoke realism as a
possible supplement only when the former are found wanting. Of course, many scholars would presumably not wish to go this far. After all, the international system is a
logical starting point for any analysis of state behavior. Typically, foreign and security
policy is framed against the backdrop of external circumstances. Nevertheless, realist
approaches alone will rarely if ever sufªce to provide fully satisfactory explanations,
in part because this backdrop also includes nonstructural factors and because it is often
misperceived, distorted, and even obscured by conditions internal to the state. Alter-

13. See Ethan B. Kapstein, “Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics,”
International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), pp. 751–774.
14. John A. Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899–912.
15. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, especially pp. 68–73.
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native systemic and unit-level variables must necessarily be invoked. Surely, in such a
context, the position that cultural and perhaps other approaches are at best mere
supplements to realism is untenable.
—John S. Dufªeld
Athens, Georgia

To the Editors (Theo Farrell writes):
In “Culture Clash,” Michael Desch offers a dismissive assessment of the new culturalist
wave in security studies.1 Desch ªnds cultural variables hard to deªne and operationalize, culturalists reluctant to generalize across cases, and inconsistencies within culturalism in security studies such that some cultural theories have more in common with
realist theories than with other cultural ones. I deal with each of these criticisms in turn.
I then focus on Desch’s call for culturalists to subject their theories to “crucial tests.” I
propose an alternative method, more favored by social scientists and accepted by
realists, of comparing realism and culturalism as rival research programs in security
studies.

what counts as culture
Desch’s ªrst problem with culturalism in security studies is that “cultural variables are
sometimes hard to clearly deªne and operationalize” (p. 150). He fails to note that this
is equally true of material variables. Witness, for example, the debate over how to
conceptualize and measure the impact of technological superiority on air-ground combat.2 Desch dips into anthropology, sociology, and psychology to uncover “a long-standing concern about cultural theories in the social sciences,” in particular, with the concern
that “‘culture’ had lost all conceptual clarity” (pp. 150–151). Such concern is simply
misplaced when it comes to culturalism in security studies. It is true that culture,
broadly deªned, encompasses many things including beliefs, symbols, rituals, and
practices. However, most culturalists focus on norms, which are deªned as intersubjective beliefs about identity and behavior. Norms shape behavior by telling actors who
they are and what they can do in given situations. Norms come in two varieties:
constitutive norms, which deªne actors’ identities and their situations; and regulative
norms, which deªne normative and normal behavior for actors.3 A norms approach to
security studies is explicitly adopted by Eric Herring, Peter Katzenstein, Jeffrey Legro,

1. Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,”
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 141–170. Additional references are noted
with page numbers in the text.
2. Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of
Conºict,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139–179. Debate followed in “Symposium on the Gulf War and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” International Security, Vol. 22, No.
2 (Fall 1997), pp. 137–174.
3. David Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?” International Organization, Vol.
43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 454–458.
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Janice Thomson, and Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman,4 and implicitly adopted in the
work of Craig Cameron, Lynn Eden, Elizabeth Kier, and Erik Ringmar.5

making generalizations
Desch also misrepresents the culturalist literature in his second complaint, namely, that
“some new culturalists in security studies focus on the particulars of single cases, rather
than on factors common to a number of cases, because they assume that each one is
sui generis” (p. 152). Desch caricatures culturalists in security studies as “mired in the
unresolved debate about whether there can be a science of culture” (p. 154). It is this
struggle between “modernists” and “antimodernists” over epistemology that he claims
has resulted in a supposed preference for idiographic as opposed to nomothetic investigation. In fact, very few culturalists in security studies adopt an interpretivist approach.6 The great majority of them are positivists “who fully endorse the scientiªc
project of falsifying theories against evidence.”7 Indeed, this epistemological and methodological conventionalism is emphasized in the theoretical introduction to The Culture
of National Security, a major collection of culturalist works in security studies.8 The
authors of this introduction even assert that “problematizing what others take for
granted or even reify, such as the construction of state identity and interests, does not
in and of itself involve any speciªc methodological imperatives.”9 In practice, culturalist
approaches to security studies do require considerable sensitivity in historical analysis,

4. Eric Herring, “Nuclear Totem and Taboo,” paper presented at the annual conference of the
British International Studies Association, Leeds, December 1997; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural
Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post-War Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1996); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-American Restraint during World War II
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, “Status,
Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Approach,” in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996), pp. 79–113.
5. Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First
Marine Division, 1941–1951 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Lynn Eden, Constructing Destruction: Organizations, Knowledge, and the Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, forthcoming); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine
between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Erik Ringmar, Identity,
Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years’ War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
6. The only culturalist works in security studies of which I am aware that adopt interpretivist
approaches are Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1997); and Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No.
1 (January 1999), pp. 49–69.
7. Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1
(Summer 1995), p. 75. A good example is provided in the lengths to which Jeffrey Legro goes to
provide macrocorrelation and microcausation analysis to corroborate his theory. Legro, “Which
Norms Matter?: Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No.
1 (Winter 1997), pp. 31–63.
8. This is noted in Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,”
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), p. 182.
9. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture
in National Security,” in Katzenstein, Culture of National Security, p. 67.
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which in turn places “extraordinary demands on the researcher to gather mountains of
elaborate empirical data.”10 This raises the costs of multiple case studies for culturalists,
but not prohibitively so. Rather, it merely goes to underline the commitment to positivism of scholars such as Legro, Katzenstein, and Kier who apply their cultural theory
to multiple case studies.11

bringing in world culture
It is quite clear from the new culturalism in security studies that norms exist and may
be institutionalized worldwide, within individual or particular groups of states and
societies and within individual state agents (or organizations). Worldwide norms can
lead states to acquire advanced conventional weapons, much the same way as they
have national airlines, in order to afªrm their identities as modern states.12 Transsocietal
norms (e.g., liberal democracy) may form the cement of enduring alliances of likeminded states (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization).13 Equally, states may
have their own culture that shapes peculiar national forms of strategic behavior.14
Norms can also reside in organizational settings, leading to organizational preferences
for certain forms of warfare.15
Desch sees these concepts as “potentially contradictory”; for him, “concepts such as
organizational culture . . . and global culture . . . huddle uneasily under the same
culturalist umbrella” (p. 152). Indeed, he uses this example to illustrate the ambiguity
of cultural variables. As I have noted, culturalists agree on their explanatory variable,
that is, norms. They simply study norms at different levels of analysis and in different
institutional settings. Now this may indeed produce contradictory predictions. As
Desch notes, worldwide norms may predict similarity in state behavior (e.g., that new
nuclear states seek to afªrm their identity as nuclear powers by imitating the force
postures of established nuclear states16) where local norms residing in strategic or
organizational culture may predict difference in state behavior (e.g., that all nuclear
states, established and new, evolve force postures to reºect national or organizational
beliefs about nuclear power17). The point is that it is perfectly legitimate for a research
program to contain theories that make contradictory predictions. Not only do realists
accept this, they even admit that realism makes contradictory predictions about state
behavior.18
10. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations,” p. 198.
11. Legro, Cooperation under Fire, p. 33; Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 11–14;
and Kier, Imagining War, pp. 35–36.
12. Eyre and Suchman, “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons.”
13. Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,”
in Katzenstein, Culture of National Security, pp. 357–450.
14. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
15. Legro, Cooperation under Anarchy; Cameron, American Samurai; Kier, Imagining War; and Eden,
Constructing Destruction.
16. Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,”
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 73–76.
17. Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986).
18. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, “Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez,”
American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), p. 924.
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In any case, until recently culturalists have concentrated on local cultural models to
the neglect of world culture models of identity and behavior. For Legro and Kier,
organizational culture refers solely to norms that are peculiar to individual organizations.19 Equally, Katzenstein looks only at how national norms shape state behavior.20
Desch recommends that culturalists continue to focus on norms “particular to individual states” to avoid inconsistencies between local and world culture (p. 152). I disagree
for two reasons. First, worldwide norms clearly have tremendous relevance for security
studies. For example, the conduct of warfare is regulated by formal worldwide norms
of war institutionalized in international law.21 And by outlawing certain forms of
warfare, international law constitutes legitimate, “civilized,“ forms of war.22 Second,
the present culturalist focus on local culture is out of line with mainstream constructivism in international relations and with sociology’s new institutionalism (the dominant sociological approach to organizational analysis), both of which concentrate on
worldwide norms. International relations constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt and
Martha Finnemore, examine how international norms shape state behavior by telling
states what they are supposed to look like and how they are supposed to act.23 Similarly,
new institutionalists highlight the role of world culture in shaping the organization of
public life in the modern world.24 Unlike Legro’s and Kier’s treatments of organizations
as “cultural islands,” new institutionalists view organizations as “open systems” because the norms encoded in organizational culture and embodied in organizational
practices are seen as coming from the environment within which the organization
operates.25 Thus the boundary between world culture and local culture becomes blurred
because norms may have multiple residences at the world and local levels. Worldwide
norms are beginning to receive attention from culturalists in security studies.26 Culturalists now need to attend to the issue of how local norms and worldwide norms
interact to shape the behavior of states and organizations.

the limits of crucial case studies
Desch puts considerable effort into showing that culturalists have failed to prove
conclusively that their theories have greater predictive power than realist ones because,
as he sees it, their case outcomes are biased toward cultural theory, explainable by
realist theories, inaccurately explained by cultural theories, or simply unclear (pp.

19. Legro, Cooperation under Fire, pp. 17–20; and Kier, Imagining War, p. 30.
20. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 153–190.
21. Geoffrey Best, War and Law since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
22. Price, Chemical Weapons Taboo, pp. 35–38.
23. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–425; and Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
24. John M. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, “World Society and
the Nation-State,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 193, No. 1 (July 1997), pp. 144–181.
25. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
26. Theo Farrell, “Culture and Military Power,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (July
1998), pp. 407–416; and Eyre and Suchman, “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional
Weapons.”
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158–166). Here Desch is referring to Harry Eckstein’s argument that theories may be
validated or refuted on the basis of a single “crucial case study.”27 In their acclaimed
text on social science methodology, Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba
dismiss Eckstein’s notion of testing theory through single observation because of its
inconsistency with the ”fundamental problem of causal inference.“ Here they refer to
the problem that no matter how perfect the research design, data collection, and
experiment, “we will never know a causal inference for certain.”28 This problem is
particularly acute in single-observation studies because of the associated risks of indeterminacy (where inferences outnumber observed implications), extreme vulnerability
to measurement error (leading to false conclusion), and inability to control for unknown
causal factors.29
In short, single-observation studies, “crucial” or otherwise, are of little use in testing
theories. Indeed, for Imre Lakatos, any attempt to prove or disprove theory through
experimentation alone is to engage in “naive methodological falsiªcation.” This is
because discrepant ªndings can always be explained by adding auxiliary propositions
to the theory. Instead, Lakatos recommends that sets of theories, or research programs,
be tested for their theoretical progressiveness, that is, their ability to predict novel facts,
and their empirical progressiveness, that is, for evidence that corroborates these new
predictions.30 In other words, if culturalism predicts something that realism does not—
such as a state will go to war to defend its self-perceived identity (as say, a great
power)—and evidence can be produced to corroborate this hypothesis—such as a state
going to war in which it has no interests at stake—this suggests that culturalism is a
progressive research program.31 All it takes is a few such examples to verify the
progressiveness of a research program. By extension, a research program that fails to
demonstrate its theoretical and empirical progressiveness is degenerating, and so is best
abandoned. Now Desch advocates “pit[ting] culturalist theories against the evidence
and against realist theories to ascertain just how much they really explain” (p. 158),
and in so doing he even refers to Lakatos’s metaphor of a “three-cornered ªght.” But
he conducts this ªght according to the rules of naive methodological falsiªcation, using
Arthur Stinchcombe’s method of “crucial experiment,“ whereby it is “a set of observations which will decide between two alternative theories.”32
John Vasquez recently applied Lakatos’s method of “sophisticated methodological
falsiªcation” to test realism’s progressiveness as a research program.33 This invited
responses from several prominent realists, all of whom (but one) accepted the validity
27. Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson
W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Volume 7, Strategies of Inquiry (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley, 1975).
28. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientiªc Inference
in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 79.
29. Ibid., pp. 129, 209–211.
30. Imre Lakatos, “Falsiªcation and the Methodology of Science Research Programs,” in Lakatos
and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970), pp. 91–196.
31. For one such case, see Ringmar, Identity, Interest, and Action.
32. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World,
1968), p. 25.
33. John A. Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Pro-
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of Lakatos’s method (their disagreement was over how Vasquez applied it).34 In my
view, however, Vasquez’s main failing was in not pitting realism against a rival theory
as well as the historical record. By merely comparing realism against history, Vasquez
did not provide the three-way ªght necessary for true sophisticated methodological
falsiªcation.
In the article following Desch’s, Ted Hopf presents what he calls a “loosely Lakatosian research program” for constructivism in international relations.35 Hopf’s purpose
is to develop constructivism as a progressive research program, but he does not clearly
identify constructivism’s main rival. Therefore Hopf mirrors Vasquez in failing to give
us a three-cornered ªght. Below I offer ringside seats for the ªrst bout between
culturalism, realism, and history.

culturalism versus realism versus history
Lakatos’s sophisticated methodological falsiªcation is quite straightforward in application: “The crucial element in falsiªcation is whether the new theory offers any novel,
excess information compared with its predecessor and whether some of this excess
information is corroborated.” Signiªcantly, even a “few excess-verifying instances are
decisive.”36 In other words, if culturalism can explain existing puzzles in world politics,
and illuminate new puzzles, then it is veriªed as a progressive research program. By
deªnition, should realism fail to counter this by explaining away culturalism’s puzzles
and coming up with some new ones of its own, then it is a degenerating research
program.
As Hopf points out, culturalism provides powerful explanations for two puzzles of
world politics highlighted by realism. The ªrst puzzle is the balance of power. Whereas
realism predicts states balancing against power, Stephen Walt persuasively demonstrates that in fact states balance against threats. Hopf argues that a constructivist
account of identity offers superior leverage in explaining how threats are formed and
alliances forged.37 The second puzzle is the security dilemma, which is created by the
uncertainty states face in assessing the intentions of others. Hopf points out that
although the security dilemma is an important dynamic in conºictual interstate relationships, it is irrelevant for many pairs and groups of states that enjoy nonconºictual

grams: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899–912.
34. See Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories”; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Progressive Research on Degenerative Alliances”; Elman and Elman, “Lakatos and Neorealism”; and
Stephen M. Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” all in American Political Science Review, Vol.
91, No. 4 (December 1997). Only Walt rejected Lakatos’s method of falsiªcation; see pp. 913–926,
931–934.
35. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism.”
36. Lakatos, “Falsiªcation and the Methodology of Science Research Programs,” pp. 120–121
(emphasis in original).
37. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism,” pp. 186–187. Hopf cites Stephen M. Walt, The Origins
of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987). For culturalist accounts of alliance
dynamics, see Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community”; and Michael N.
Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,” in Katzenstein, Culture of National Security,
pp. 400–450.

Correspondence 167

relations. He notes that norms can explain why most interstate relations are not subject
to security dilemmas: “By providing meaning, identities reduce uncertainty.”38 Sometimes identities can create uncertainty, and in this way norms also explain why states
can come to view one another with suspicion, form conºictual relations, and ªnd
themselves trapped in a security dilemma.39
Culturalism also explains a new puzzle in world politics that is unaccounted for by
realism, namely, the absence of war between liberal democracies.40 Although most
proponents of liberal democratic peace theory are not culturalists as such, norms ªgure
in all accounts of this phenomenon.41 Essentially, it is argued that liberal democracies
do not ªght wars with each other because “norms of compromise and cooperation
prevent their conºicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes.”42 Some accounts
emphasize these “norms of bounded competition” as coming from domestic democratic
principles and institutions;43 other accounts focus on liberal principles and institutions.44
Some theorists attempt to compare the causal effect of domestic principles with domestic institutions on state behavior;45 other theorists argue that such an exercise is nonsense because domestic principles and practice are mutually constitutive and support
each other.46 The point is that these principles, whether rooted in democracy or liberalism, and the domestic practices they give rise to, are norms.
Realists have responded by questioning the empirical validity of the liberal democratic peace. They argue that because wars are rare, and liberal democracies have been
historically few and far between, the lack of war between them is not statistically
signiªcant.47 Realists further argue that war has not occurred between the growing
numbers of post–World War II liberal democracies because of common alliance interests
generated by the Cold War.48 Proponents of liberal democratic peace theory have
responded in turn with their own studies showing that war and liberal democracies
had sufªcient spatial and temporal commonality prior to World War II for there to be

38. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism,” p. 188.
39. Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.”
40. Lack of space prevents me from discussing a second culturalist puzzle in world politics,
namely, the isomorphic pattern of global military development. For discussion on this, see chapters
by Chris Demchak, Theo Farrell, and Emily Goldman, in Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., “The
Sources of Military Change,” unpublished manuscript.
41. This point is made in Zeev Maoz, “The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard
Action or Cracks in the Wall?” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), p. 185.
42. Zeev Maoz and Bruce M. Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,
1946–1986,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), p. 624.
43. William J. Dixon, “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conºict,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 14–32.
44. Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 80,
No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1152–1169.
45. Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,” pp. 624–638.
46. John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security, Vol. 19,
No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87–125.
47. Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” International Security,
Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5–49; and David E. Spiro, “The Insigniªcance of the Liberal Peace,”
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50–86.
48. Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Polities and Peace,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2
(Fall 1995), pp. 123–146.
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statistical signiªcance in the lack of war between liberal democracies.49 Tests also
showed that “democracy, rather than alliance, prevents conºict and war.”50
Aside from these arguments over statistics and coding, two possible inconsistencies
remain: liberal democracies are just as war prone as other types of states when it comes
to ªghting nonliberal democracies, and, on occasion, liberal democracies appear to have
gone to war with each other (e.g., Allied powers vs. Imperial Germany in World War I).
Culturalism helps us here by focusing on how the construction of identity shapes the
application of norms of bounded competition. In other words, the liberal democratic
peace is the absence of war between states that perceive themselves and each other to be
liberal democracies.51 In sum, the lack of war between liberal democracies is a puzzle
that realists refuse to recognize and culturalists can explain.
In defending realism against history, Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman hide
behind Lakatos. They rightly point out that “only better theories can displace theories,
but we have yet to construct a competing research program that can account for both
new facts and anomalies as well as past patterns of state behavior.”52 I argue that
culturalism is able to explain two central realist puzzles: the balance of threat and the
security dilemma. In addition, culturalism explains a new puzzle unaccounted for by
realists, namely, the liberal democratic peace. This spells trouble for realism.

the end of realism?
Few culturalists would recognize the picture Desch paints of their research program.
Contrary to his portrayal, culturalists are clearly deªning cultural variables and are
committed to rigorous testing of cultural theories through multiple case studies. His
call for culturalism in security studies to prove itself by conducting “crucial tests” of
cultural theory is similarly invalid in terms of accepted social science methodology.
Desch’s conclusion that “while we should applaud the return to culture in security
studies, we should not be swept away by this latest wave” (p. 170) brings to mind an
alternative nautical metaphor involving “rats” and a “sinking ship.“ The purpose of
sophisticated methodological falsiªcation is to direct scholars away from dried-up,
degenerating research programs toward fertile, progressive ones. Unless realists can
revive their research program, by explaining culturalist puzzles in world politics and
coming up with some new puzzles of their own, they would indeed be best advised
to jump ship.
—Theo Farrell
Exeter, United Kingdom

49. Zeev Maoz and Bruce M. Russett, “Alliance, Wealth, Contiguity, and Political Stability: Is the
Lack of Conºict between Democracies a Statistical Artifact?” International Interactions, Vol. 17, No.
4 (January 1992), pp. 245–267.
50. Maoz, “The Controversy over the Democratic Peace,” p. 176.
51. Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Democratic Peace–Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4
(December 1995), pp. 491–517; and Ido Oren, “The Subjectivity of the ‘Democratic’ Peace: Changing
U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 147–184.
52. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, “History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 192.
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To the Editors (Richard Price writes):
Michael Desch’s assessment of cultural theories suffers from a number of serious ºaws.1
They stem largely from a fundamental orientation to scholarship that forestalls his
article from engaging in a genuinely constructive intellectual dialogue that could
advance our understanding of war and peace. As a result, occasional polite gestures
toward a “qualiªed endorsement” that “culture matters” (p. 169) unfortunately ring
hollow as perfunctory pats on the head for those scholars who in the end bring “very
limited explanatory power” (p. 170) that can at best “supplement” realist theories
(p. 169).
In this reply, I note the unwarranted epistemological presumptions of Desch’s analysis, and how they result in a ºawed assessment of my own work that is intellectually
groundless. The overarching difªculty plaguing Desch’s analysis is his presumption of
the a priori superiority of realism and the reduction of the essence of all theoretical
development in international relations to one single question: whether “new theories
merely supplement realist theories or actually threaten to supplant them” (p. 141). This
conception of social science, like the realist conception of world politics, is one of
confrontation: a zero-sum game where there is room for one, and only one, theory that
must be declared the “best” and “prevail.” The approach is not the intellectual one of
the scholar interested above all in seeking truth—or at least removing errors—in our
understanding about the human condition. Rather, it is the combative political realm
of the election, or of the trial where truth and justice are employed only insofar as they
help the lawyer attain victory in getting to where she knows beforehand she has to
arrive.
In Desch’s article, this approach to scholarship manifests itself in an attempt to
measure the value of culturalist approaches vis-à-vis realism by an assessment of which
is “superior.” But superior for what? Sometimes the criterion is undefended, as when
Desch manages in the same sentence to state that even though culturalist scholarship
gets the cases right on “easy cases” they cannot demonstrate the “superiority of the
culturalist approach” (p. 160). Similarly, his dismissal of culturalist arguments if they
produce a similar prediction to realism (p. 163) merely jigs the game. Realism may be
right for the wrong reasons (even a broken clock gets it right twice a day), so surely
alternative arguments warrant equal consideration. On what basis is realism presumed
innocent and challengers presumed guilty?
One could only make sense of such statements in light of a Lakatosian conception
of theoretical superiority (only better theories can displace theories), and Desch’s position ultimately hinges on the positivist grail of prediction as its criterion. The ritual
invocation by realists of this ªat of theory development, however, does not relieve them
of the burden of defending it, nor does it disguise its all-too-convenient political
function of maintaining realism’s presumed theoretical hegemony. Desch assumes prediction as the unproblematic standard for all scholarship about world politics, but feels

1. Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,”
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 141–170. Further references are noted with
page numbers in the text.
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no need to justify it given the self-anointed dominant position of his political theory of
realism and his conception of social science. The failure to acknowledge that there are
different theories and conceptions of social science is a most curious spectacle, indeed,
given the ºourishing epistemological debates in international relations, not to mention
other ªelds.
While Desch notes that cultural approaches are not a good match for a social science
predicated on prediction (p. 154), the implication is that we throw out theories that do
not live up to the standard rather than rethink the standard. The implicit scientiªc
legitimation of realism is especially ironic given Desch’s failure to come clean that his
own preferred theory has failed spectacularly and repeatedly to live up to his own
criterion. Especially in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, it is simply not tenable
to pretend that if prediction in a meaningful scientiªc sense is honestly applied as the
determinative standard, then realism should not also go out with the rest of the
theoretical bathwater. If the defense of realism is based upon the epistemological criteria
of prediction, it fails, and other defenses based upon the political content of realism are
either absent or fare no better.
Because Desch reduces approaches to world politics to one mode, he is simply unable
to appreciate what many culturalist approaches contribute to scholarship. Some constructivist scholarship does indeed seek to provide explanations for the behavior of
states, making a genuine effort toward engagement by taking on mainstream theories
on their own terms. Many forms of constructivist scholarship, however, are not oriented
toward making predictions or explaining the role of culture as an independent causal
variable for state behavior, but instead address different types of questions based upon
different ontological assumptions, and for which different methods and answers are
appropriate.2 Assessing the relative value of different approaches according to a single
crude standard of which one prevails simply does not make any sense given that
different approaches variously complement, subsume, supplement, or compete with
Desch’s theories. Desch eventually moves toward a position that would culminate
logically in the right conclusion that adjudication of rival approaches is ultimately an
empirical question (pp. 168–169), but he stops short because he cannot square this with
his insistence that only one theory must prevail as superior, as if we are allowed to use
only the hammer from our analytical toolbox.
The inability to appreciate these subtleties manifests itself in Desch’s assessment of
my work on chemical weapons (CW). Desch simply ignores the various contributions
and deªciencies of alternative arguments in accounting for instances of the nonuse of
CW, and instead reduces them all to a crude winner-take-all judgment of which one is
“best” (p. 163). But best for what and when? If it is prediction, then realism fails. Desch’s
prediction would seem to be that CW would be used only when chemical powers face
adversaries with no offensive or defensive chemical capability, a view that surely does
have some merit for important moments in the historical record as I happily grant. But
this cannot explain other important moments, such as why the belligerents continued
to use CW throughout World War I, or why CW have not been used in countless
2. Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and
Constructivism,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 259–
294.
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occasions where a chemically armed adversary faced an opponent with no CW capability. Why did the United States simply not employ its lethal sarin arsenal as freely as
any other uncontroversial weapon in Vietnam? Is Desch really prepared to argue that
the normative taboo had nothing to do with it? Or that such weapons objectively could
have been of no use whatsoever? If so, why did the United States and other military
powers continue to invest so much in them?
In my book, I demonstrate simply that the nonuse of chemical weapons cannot be
explained without the normative taboo, and then also seek to answer a different
question: how the moral discourse itself was constructed such that these weapons were
deªned as a category apart from so many other weapons.3 Desch’s realism skirts the
subtleties of this question, and as such his response does not return the favor of dealing
with the arguments of an alternative approach on its own terms. We can jettison the
normative discourse as unworthy of study only if we maintain that one can explain the
nonuse of chemical weapons without any resort to the taboo. Not only are authors of
the excellent studies cited by Desch for support not willing to go as far as he implies
(John Ellis Van Courtland Moon and Frederic Brown), but my work and Jeffrey Legro’s
have demonstrated in detail how materialist arguments about the supposed lack of
military utility of CW are just empirically wrong at crucial junctures, and need to be
contextualized in others.4 My conclusions are certainly contingent and subject to revision, amendment, or even refutation, but only by careful primary research, the revelation of new information, or the introduction of a new theoretical conceptualization that
makes additional sense of the history of CW. The anachronistic reassertion of deductive
arguments whose valid contributions I have incorporated and whose empirical
deªciencies I have laid bare simply will not do if our aim is the cumulation of
scholarship.
Similarly, I do not reject deterrence arguments wholesale as wrong or a worse
explanation. Rather, I detail the instances in which they are valuable, wrong, or indeterminate, and delineate the ways my own account complements or competes with
deterrence theory. The above anomalies, among others, demonstrate that deterrence
cannot by itself account for all situations of the nonuse of CW, nor can it provide an
adequate account of how these weapons have been categorized apart from others.
Desch even fails to note that the two variables he ascribes as “realist” lie in tension
with each other and alone could produce different predictions. If CW were truly of
such limited utility, why would great powers stockpile them and be so afraid of their
use as to make the threat to use them a deterrent strategy? If CW were judged to be
of such low utility, the response of would-be adversaries to their possessors would be
that of Mikhail Gorbachev to Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative—ignore it.
Desch suggests that the use of CW in World War I is a problem for the taboo, while
eliding the fact that if they truly had no utility they presumably would not have

3. Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
4. John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, “Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The World War II Experience, International Security, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 3–35; Frederic J. Brown, Chemical
Warfare: A Study in Restraint (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968); and Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation
under Fire: Anglo-American Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1995).
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continued to be used in such enormous quantities. Desch cannot have it both ways, but
is driven to such inconsistencies because he constricts himself to allowing only one
applicant for a job that requires several talents.
Desch suggests that I “would have to” (p. 164) deal with why CW were used against
Jews, Chinese, and Ethiopians before and during World War II. Why he uses the
conditional is bafºing, because I explicitly offer an account to make sense of the latter
two cases and others, including World War I.5 I offer these arguments precisely to rectify
difªculties in both realist and international legal accounts for the puzzling record of
use and nonuse, difªculties that stem from a positivist conceptualization of norms as
independent variables. I argue that the history of CW cannot be understood without
(1) understanding the ways in which norms operate quite unlike independent variables,
and (2) appreciating how the taboo was implicated in the hierarchical ordering of zones
of violence into “civilized” and “uncivilized” areas. Desch replies to neither argument.
The careful reader will observe that Desch simply avoids the challenges I have laid
in the form of anomalies for realism, and he does not engage the questions that I pose
to assess their relative contribution. He fails to deal frankly with the shortcomings of
his preferred answers and formulate new explanations or uncover new information
that would challenge my claims. On his own terms, this is a classic sign of a degenerating research program. The jury is not to rely on years of archival research of scholars,
but instead the repeated assurances of l’avocat. Some of the uncommitted in a jury might
be swayed by the lawyer who adamantly repeats her message in the face of all evidence
to the contrary, but such indiscretions will fail to persuade the skeptic open to being
convinced. Pushing a political theory so far in front of basic scholarly integrity ironically
allies Desch’s realism with some postmodernists, for whom the practice and study of
international relations are indistinguishable as pure politics. Rather than reciprocating
the dialogue by illuminating how realism would deal with the anomalies that I and
other constructivists have documented, Desch merely retreats to repeating the easy
cases for realism. Given that he impugns this tactic as insufªcient to supplant existing
explanations (pp. 169–170), one can only conclude that the burden of proof is reversed
and that the defense rests.
—Richard Price
Minneapolis, Minnesota

The Author Replies:
I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the comments on “Culture Clash”1 by John
Dufªeld, Theo Farrell, and Richard Price.2 I begin by brieºy summarizing the main
claims of my original article and pointing out several issues about which we more or

5. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo, pp. 100–108, 112, chap. 3.
1. Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,”
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 141–170.
2. Subsequent references to these letters appear parenthetically in the text.
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less agree. The bulk of my response, however, examines what I see as the central issue
in this debate—whether culturalism can supplant realism—and indicates why I ªnd
their arguments unconvincing.
My main objective in writing “Culture Clash” was to assess the latest wave of
cultural approaches to security studies. As the letters by Dufªeld, Farrell, and Price
make clear, scholars who employ cultural approaches see themselves as challenging—
and ultimately replacing—the dominant realist paradigm. By contrast, I concluded that
although cultural theories might be able to supplement realism, there is little reason to
believe they will supplant it. This is because cultural theories do not do a better job
than realism at explaining how the world works.
The letters by Dufªeld, Farrell, and Price raise four issues about which we do not in
fact disagree. One charge is that I regard comparing theories as a “zero-sum game,
where there is room for one, and only one, theory that must be declared the ‘best’ and
‘prevail’” (Price, p. 169). However, my argument that cultural theories could supplement realism explicitly acknowledges that both approaches may be of value. A second
charge is that I employ a “double standard in assessing the relative merits of cultural
and realist approaches” (Dufªeld, p. 156). In fact, I believe that rival theories should
be held to the same standard.3 My preference for realism rests on its ability to outperform cultural theories even in those cases where cultural approaches should be at an
advantage. The third charge is that I reject cultural theories because they exhibit various
conceptual ºaws (e.g., vague deªnitions of key terms, lack of generalizability, and
contradictions within the cultural family of theories) while failing to acknowledge that
realist theories display similar weaknesses. I did mention these potential conceptual
problems in my article, but I explicitly stated that “they do not present insurmountable
obstacles” to the development and testing of cultural theories.4 Moreover, I freely
acknowledge that realism too has conceptual problems that I also believe can be
surmounted through careful scholarship. A ªnal charge (Farrell, p. 162) is that I advocate single case studies, a position supposedly incompatible with Imre Lakatos’s
method of assessing rival research programs through “sophisticated falsiªcation.”5 I
did not advocate single cases instead of large-n studies but simply argued that when

3. “Culture Clash” focused primarily on the limitations of cultural theories; much of my other
work has critiqued certain aspects of realism. My ªrst book, When the Third World Matters: Latin
America and U.S. National Security (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), and a
related article, “Why Realists Disagree about the Third World (And Why They Shouldn’t),” Security
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 358–384, are critiques of neorealist arguments about the
strategic importance of peripheral areas of the world. In Michael C. Desch, “War and Strong States,
Peace and Weak States,” International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 237–268, I
argued that realism lacked a theory of the state, which makes it unable to explain many signiªcant
changes in the nature of the post–Cold War states. Finally, my new book, Civilian Control of the
Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999),
shows that realist theories are sometimes indeterminate and need to be supplemented by other
sorts of theories.
4. “Culture Clash,” p. 150. There were also a few outright misreadings of the piece, such as
Dufªeld’s mistaken claim that I included organization theory within realism. See pp. 154–155 and
Figure 1.
5. “Sophisticated falsiªcation,” as opposed to the more “naive” version, requires not that there be
no instances in which theories in a given research program are wrong, but that the theories of a
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comparing rival theories, scholars must be sure to include cases in which competing
theories make distinct predictions. This is a widely accepted principle among methodologists and not at all incompatible with Lakatos’s approach.6
The real issue in this debate is whether culturalism can supplant or merely supplement realism in explaining the real world of international politics. In other words,
which approach is most consistent with the typical behavior of states?
Taken together, Dufªeld, Farrell, and Price offer ªve examples where cultural theories
allegedly outperform realism. Speciªcally, Farrell argues that culturalism better accounts for balance-of-threat theory, the security dilemma, and the absence of war
among democracies. Dufªeld suggests that culture can explain the seemingly anomalous strategic behavior of Germany and Japan, but realism cannot. Finally, Price argues
that realism cannot account for the use or nonuse of chemical and biological weapons,
but his cultural (i.e., normative) theory can. Upon close inspection, however, none of
these cases lends much support to a cultural interpretation. Indeed, several of them
provide powerful support for realist theories.
I turn ªrst to Farrell because his examples of where cultural theories supposedly
outperform realism are easiest to rebut. Despite his arguments to the contrary, the
democratic peace, balance-of-threat theory, and the security dilemma do not challenge
realist theories as much as he claims. Concerning the democratic peace theory, scholars
have cast enough doubt on both the causal logic of the argument and the statistical
evidence undergirding it that it constitutes a thin reed on which to hang a dismissal of
realism.7 Stephen Walt’s formulation of balance-of-threat theory assumes that an adversary’s material power is a necessary, if not sufªcient, condition for triggering balancing
dynamics, and his adding hostile intentions hardly constitutes a fundamental refutation
of realism.8 Indeed, realists acknowledge that material factors are not always sufªcient
for explaining state behavior.9 Finally, much of the literature on the security dilemma
has been concerned not with intentions but with how material factors such as geogra-

new research program account for all that other theories do and more (e.g., that they provide
“excess information”). Lakatos believes that knowledge progresses through the clash of research
programs rather than just through individual theory testing by comparison to empirical evidence.
See Imre Lakatos, “Falsiªcation and the Methodology of Scientiªc Research Programmes,” in
Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), pp. 91–195.
6. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientiªc Inference in
Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 41, and Stephen Van
Evera, Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science (Cambridge, Mass.: Defense and Arms
Control Studies Program, MIT, 1996), p. 17, emphasize the importance of “unique predictions” for
comparative theory testing. And Lakatos, “Falsiªcation and the Methodology of Scientiªc Research
Programmes,” pp. 120–121, accepts this.
7. See the essays by Christopher Layne, David Spiro, and Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, in
Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).
8. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).
9. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 78,
cautions that “one must ask how and to what extent the structure of a realm accounts for
outcomes.”
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phy and technology make intentions irrelevant.10 Readers need only look at the recent
discussions of the offense-defense balance, a central component of the security dilemma, to see that this balance is largely a function of the interaction of the material
characteristics of weapons systems and the geographical positioning of states.11
John Dufªeld argues that the post–Cold War security policies of Germany and Japan
constitute a direct challenge to realism and provide strong support for culturalism. He
believes that current events support this argument because eight years after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, neither Germany nor Japan is acting like a traditional great power.
Indeed, this is one of the culturalists’ favorite puzzles for realism.12 According to
Dufªeld, cultural theories predict that both Germany and Japan will continue to eschew
a signiªcant military buildup and a vigorous use of military force abroad. He ascribes
their willingness to rely upon alternative instruments of statecraft to their paciªstic
strategic cultures. Conversely, a realist theory would expect the post–Cold War security
policies of Germany and Japan to diverge, reºecting the different strategic environment
each faces. Deªnitive tests of these two theories cannot yet be conducted because both
are still to some extent “semisovereign states,” and the end of the Cold War is still very
recent. But based on current trends, realism offers a better explanation than culturalism
for post–Cold War German and Japanese behavior.
During the Cold War, realists explained the seemingly anomalous behaviors of
Germany and Japan by pointing to their status as “semisovereign states.” Because each
was constrained by U.S. occupation and protected by U.S. power, neither had to devote
as much effort to its own defense as it otherwise would have. Still, even given U.S.
protection, Germany responded to the more immediate Soviet threat by arming itself
more than did Japan.13
Today Germany and Japan continue to behave in different ways. Thus far, Germany
has been content to reduce its standing military forces, lower its defense spending, and
limit its use of force to operations such as peacekeeping in Bosnia. This is hardly
surprising because Germany’s primary threat—the Soviet Union—has disintegrated,
largely for reasons that realists understand.14 The few remaining threats (e.g., unrest in
10. The classic statement of this is John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1950), pp. 157–180.
11. Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We
Measure It?” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 61–70, argue that four of the
ªve variables that affect the offense-defense balance are material.
12. Others who point to this case as evidence of the salience of domestic cultural factors include
Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and
Policies,” and Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of AntiMilitarism,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84–118, 119–150, respectively.
13. Of the 816,037 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops stationed on the Central
Front in 1983, 495,000, or 61 percent, were German. Calculated from the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1983/84 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
14. The end of the Cold War came very much in the fashion George Kennan (Mr. X) anticipated
in his canonical realist text “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July
1947), pp. 566–582. Even neorealism did much better than its critics give it credit for. See Waltz,
Theory of International Politics, pp. 179–180, concerning his belief that the Soviet Union would have
a hard time keeping up with the United States in a prolonged bipolar rivalry.
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the former Yugoslavia) are best handled by passing the buck to NATO and the United
States, a quintessentially realist strategy in some circumstances.15 For example, Germany made only a token contribution to the air campaign against Serbia.16 Moreover,
even with its low level of defense spending and military forces, Germany is now the
dominant economic power in Europe and could quickly become the dominant military
power should circumstances change.17 Dufªeld suggests that eight years is too long to
constitute a legitimate lag in strategic reorientation. But viewed historically, strategic
reorientations have taken far longer. For example, German uniªcation in 1871 fundamentally upset the nineteenth-century European balance of power, but France and
Russia did not align until 1894, and Great Britain did not complete its strategic reorientation until the eve of World War I.18 Given the benign threat environment Germany
faces and its current potential power advantage, Germany’s relaxed post–Cold War
security posture does not represent much of a puzzle for realism.
Japan’s post–Cold War security policy presents an even more serious problem for
Dufªeld’s analysis. Japan’s strategic situation is much less benign than Germany’s, so
it is not surprising that despite its antinuclear and paciªst rhetoric, Japan has adopted
a more assertive national security policy. North Korea, because of its recent missile test
combined with mounting evidence that Pyongyang continues to pursue its own nuclear
capability, is the most immediate threat Japan faces. The more signiªcant long-term
problem is the continuing growth of Chinese conventional and nuclear power. Japanese
elites are increasingly aware that exclusive reliance upon the U.S. security guarantee
may not be a viable strategy in the future. Many in the Japanese public resent the
presence of American military forces in Japan, and others are beginning to realize that
the United States and Japan do not always have identical interests. All of these changes
in the strategic environment are undermining the Japanese public’s antimilitary consensus.19
Indeed, there is abundant evidence that changes in the strategic environment are
forcing Japanese leaders to reassess their security posture. For now, most elites remain

15. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World
Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 232; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder,
“Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137–168; and John J. Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics
(New York: W.W. Norton, forthcoming), chaps. 4, 7.
16. Of the more than ªve hundred NATO planes operating against Serbia as of mid-April 1999,
only fourteen were German (less than 3 percent). The Germans also sent one frigate, the FGS
Rheinland Pfalz, to join sixteen other NATO vessels, most of which were American. See Bundeswehr,
“Kosovo Konºikt Deutsche Beteiligung am NATO-Einsatz in Jugoslawien” (http://www.bundeswehr.de/kosov/9903_0004.html); and U.S. Department of Defense, “Operation Allied Force”
(http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo).
17. In 1997 Germany had a gross national product of $2.2 trillion compared with France’s $1.5
trillion, the United Kingdom’s $1.2 trillion, and Russia’s $1.1 trillion. See IISS, The Military Balance
1997/98 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
18. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conºict
from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 224–232.
19. See Masao Kunihiro, “The Decline and Fall of Paciªsm,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53,
No. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 35–39.
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committed to the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the American nuclear umbrella as
Japan’s ªrst line of defense. However, increasing numbers of Japanese elites do not
think that this umbrella should be Japan’s last line of defense. While Japan’s employment of its military forces abroad so far remains modest, fundamental changes in its
national security policy are taking place in two other realms. First, despite the end of
the Cold War, Japanese defense spending continues to rise.20 Second, in the face of
widely held antinuclear norms, Japan has become a “virtual nuclear power.” As has
been widely reported, Japan has developed a civilian nuclear energy program based
on plutonium-fueled reactors.21 This sort of program makes little economic or technological sense if the objective is exclusively the generation of electricity. It makes a great
deal of strategic sense, however, if the goal is to acquire a nuclear option, because this
sort of civilian nuclear program can be weaponized very quickly.22 In addition, the H-2
ballistic missile gives Japan a potentially robust nuclear delivery capability. As a result,
there is a growing recognition that Japan is now a virtual nuclear power, and Japanese
ofªcials do not hesitate to point this out.23 I heard a Self-Defense Forces ofªcer argue,
in the course of a talk purportedly on why Japan should not go nuclear, that it
nonetheless had that capability and it was good that other states knew it.24 Thus, despite
Japan’s antinuclear rhetoric, the reality is that Japan already has a virtual deterrent
nuclear force and could have an actual one very quickly.
Japan’s shifting security policy is evident in other ways as well. Given the nuclear
threat Japan faces from North Korea, China, and Russia, it is not surprising that Japan
is interested in systems such as the United States’ theater high-altitude area defense.25
Moreover, the reality is that given Japan’s virtual nuclear capability, the deployment of
such an antiballistic missile system could have serious regional repercussions. By itself,
such a purely defensive system, even if it did provide a reasonable level of ballistic
missile defense capability, might not be destabilizing. Whatever Japan’s intentions, such
a stance would lead many of Japan’s neighbors to assume that it was pursuing a nuclear
warªghting, rather than just a deterrent, posture. Last year I participated in a seminar

20. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Japan’s defense spending
has increased each year from 1988 through 1997. See the chart at http://www.spiri.se/
cgi-bin/backend/milex.pl?coun=japan. Rajan Menon, “The Once and Future Superpower,” Bulletin
of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 29–35, reminds us that Japan
currently has the world’s third largest defense budget.
21. On this issue generally, see Selig S. Harrison, ed., Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate
and East Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996).
22. Eiichi Katahara, “Japan’s Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Nonproliferation,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Fall 1997), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/katahra.htm.
23. David E. Sanger, “Effort to Solve Energy Woes Clashes with Nuclear Safety,” New York Times,
August 20, 1994, pp. 1, 4. For speciªc examples of Japan’s willingness to ºex its “virtual nuclear
muscles,” see Andrew Mack, “Potential, Not Proliferation,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53,
No. 4 (July/August 1997), pp. 49–50.
24. Colonel Noburo Yamaguchi, “Japan’s Nuclear Policy in the Post–Cold War Era: A Military
Perspective,” speech given at a joint John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and U.S.-Japan
Program seminar, Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 11, 1997.
25. David E. Sanger, “New Missile Defense in Japan under Discussion with U.S.,” New York Times,
September 18, 1993, pp. 1, 2.

International Security 24:1 178

for a group of high-level Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and American ofªcials, and when
we came to this issue, the Chinese and the Koreans were quite emphatic in expressing
their concerns about Japan’s moves to acquire a ballistic missile defense system.26 And
it is not hard to see why they are worried by a rhetorically paciªst and antinuclear
Japan that nevertheless has acquired a nascent nuclear capability and is increasingly
interested in ballistic missile defense.
In short, contrary to what Dufªeld suggests, the diverging trends in post–Cold War
German and Japanese security policies do not lend much support to cultural theories,
but are fully compatible with a realist theory that would emphasize the different
security environments each faces.
Finally, Price argues that patterns of use and nonuse of chemical and biological
weapons before and during World War II are best explained by the conºuence of two
norms: chemical and biological weapons are so horrible that their use was uncivilized;
and given that, they could be used only against uncivilized adversaries. According to
Price, this explains why the Italians used chemical weapons against the Ethiopians and
the Japanese used biological weapons against the Chinese, but the Axis never used
either of these weapons against the Allies.27 Conversely, a realist argument would hold
that deterrence (does the other side have similar weapons it could use in retaliation?)
and utility (would their use confer a military advantage?) would determine when
chemical and biological weapons were used.
Price’s normative argument does not square as well with the historical record as do
the realist deterrence and utility arguments. If the use of chemical and biological
weapons during this period had been restricted only to these cases, then it would be
impossible to disentangle Price’s normative explanation from deterrence and utility
arguments. But the universe of use and nonuse cases in this period is larger than Price
admits. Very few Chinese or Ethiopians were actually killed by chemical and biological
weapons.28 The largest and deadliest use of chemical weapons during World War II
occurred in the heart of civilized Europe: it was the killing of almost 3 million European
Jews (and large numbers of other non-Jewish Europeans) with poisonous gas.29 Price’s
26. These discussions were part of a seminar I gave on “Preventive Defense” at the Asia Paciªc
Forum at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, August 8, 1998.
27. See Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997),
pp. 11–12, 107.
28. There are no hard data on the exact number of Ethiopians killed by Italian poison gas attacks,
but it is probably small given that the total number of deaths from all causes in the war was 15,000.
On this, see A.J. Barker, The Civilizing Mission: A History of the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935–36 (New
York: Dail Press, 1968), p. 259. Conversely, of the 750,000 Chinese who died in the war with Japan,
a mere 700 succumbed to biological weapons and about 2,000 to chemical weapons. See John
Cookson and Judith Nottingham, A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warfare (London: Sheed and
Ward, 1969), p. 56; J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War: 1816–1965, A Statistical
Handbook (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), p. 67; and Yuki Tanaka, “Poison Gas: The Story
Japan Would Like to Forget,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 44, No. 8 (October 1988), p. 10.
29. Of the approximately 5.1 million Jews who died in the Holocaust, about 2.7 million were
liquidated in the camps using either carbon monoxide (CO) or hydrocyanic acid (zyklon B). The
remaining victims were shot or died of other causes. For statistics on the Holocaust, see Raul
Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), p. 338, Table
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normative account cannot explain why the Nazis thought using uncivilized weapons
against helpless civilians was acceptable but using them against hostile and well-armed
troops was taboo. Deterrence and utility theories have little trouble accounting for the
complete universe of cases. The Chinese, Ethiopians, and European Jews had no
retaliatory capability, but at least in the case of the Jews, there was a grisly efªciency
argument for using chemical weapons to expedite the Holocaust. Nonuse against the
Allies also makes sense because, as the experience of the last years of World War I made
clear, chemical weapons were not all that effective against prepared troops.30 Moreover,
because both Britain and the Soviet Union had large stocks with which to retaliate,
deterrence reinforced Axis reluctance to employ them in combat against the Allies.31
Finally, Price ignores the fact that during major wars adversaries are routinely dehumanized and placed beyond the pale of civilization. The Nazis’ rhetoric about the
Soviets (and their behavior toward them) was scarcely distinguishable from their
characterization of the Jews.32 And the Paciªc War was, as John Dower aptly describes
it, a “war without mercy” in which the most extreme forms of dehumanization of the
enemy were evident in the rhetoric of both sides.33 Despite this dehumanization, in
neither case were chemical and biological weapons used. Deterrence and utility arguments have no problem explaining why.
The United States’ conduct of the war in South Vietnam does not help Price’s case
either. The United States did not use sarin or other lethal chemical or biological agents,
in large measure because doing so would have had little military utility against an
B-1. Some might object that the Holocaust does not represent a legitimate case of chemical weapons
use. I reject that argument for two reasons: (1) the Nazis clearly regarded the Holocaust as an
integral part of the war; and (2) norms are always more permissive in war than in nonwar
circumstances, so it would be absurd to think that norms would have constrained Axis use of
chemical and biological weapons against Allied soldiers in war but not against Jews and other
civilians at the same time.
30. Like Dufªeld, Price thinks that relatively short lags, in this case about a year or two, constitute
a serious problem for rationalist and materialist explanations. The ªrst German use of gas was in
April 1915, and according to Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (New York:
Henry Holt, 1994), pp. 143–144, the effects were devastating. Gas gradually became less effective
throughout the course of the war as (1) the Entente acquired a chemical arsenal (deterrence); and
(2) both sides perfected their defensive capabilities (utility). I do not think that the continued use
of chemical weapons for the last one to two years of the war poses a very serious challenge to the
utility argument. To expect that gas use would cease immediately after both sides had it is
unrealistic.
31. Price provides some quotes from military ofªcers and civilian bureaucrats attesting to the
effectiveness of chemical weapons, but most of these are from individuals with a bureaucratic
interest in saying that chemical weapons are effective. See Price, Chemical Weapons Taboo, pp. 81,
97, 126. These public statements should be contrasted with what chemical warfare specialists say
in their professional manuals about the effectiveness of chemical and biological weapons against
prepared troops. The U.S. Army’s Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance [Field Manual
3–3] (November 16, 1992), pp. 1–4, notes that “if troops are wearing MOPP [mission-oriented
protective posture] 4 at the time of the attack,” casualties will be at “a negligible level.”
32. On the Kommissarbefehl, which legitimized the wholesale elimination of Russian civilians and
soldiers, see Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992), pp. 84–88.
33. John Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Paciªc War (New York: Pantheon, 1986).
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adversary conducting an unconventional war in small groups spread out through the
jungle of an ally’s territory. Indeed, the widespread skepticism that greeted the June
1998 Time/CNN story about alleged U.S. nerve gas use in Laos was in part rooted in
the judgment of many national security specialists that it would not have been practical.34 Despite widespread norms against the use of nonlethal agents, however, the
United States did use large amounts of tear gas (CS) and chemical defoliants such as
Agent Orange.35 Finally, in the face of nearly universal moral opprobrium, the United
States routinely used other really horrendous weapons such as napalm because, unlike
lethal chemicals, they had military usefulness.
As I suggested in “Culture Clash,” Price needs particular types of cases to demonstrate the power of norms. Speciªcally, he should employ cases of states armed with
chemical or biological weapons facing a major adversary that lacks them in a situation
in which they would beneªt from their use, but in which those states ultimately do not
use them purely for moral reasons. None of the cases Price looks at satisªes these
criteria.
The new culturalists’ misreading of the post–Cold War German and Japanese security
policies, and the interwar, World War II, and Vietnam War decisions to use or not to
use chemical and biological weapons, may be rooted in the fact that such constructivist
approaches to security studies, which rely heavily on rhetoric as evidence that norms
can shape state behavior, often have a difªcult time separating rhetoric from reality.36
Realist explanations, by contrast, can make better sense of even the culturalists’ best
cases because they are less likely to take such rhetorical justiªcations at face value.
Price’s letter attempts to portray me as realism’s advocate, enthusiastically defending
it before the bar of scholarly opinion. But like him and many others, I would love to
live in a world in which state conduct was restrained by strong moral norms, especially
regarding the use of force. Unfortunately, that it is not the world in which we live, and
we are not likely to any time soon. Moreover, many scholars before Dufªeld, Farrell,
and Price have penned realism’s obituary, but it remains the dominant research program in international relations not because it is perfect, but because with all its imperfections it still provides the most powerful description of how the world works and
offers the surest guide to successful foreign and defense policy. Cultural theories may
sometimes supplement realist theories, but they will not supplant them.
—Michael C. Desch
Lexington, Kentucky
34. See John L. Plaster, “Vietnam the Way It Wasn’t,” New York Times, June 18, 1998, p. 35.
35. Steve Fetter characterizes the U.S. use of chemical defoliants such as Agent Orange as the
largest employment of chemical weapons since World War I. See Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and
Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?” International Security,
Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), p. 15 n. 19.
36. For more evidence of this, see Markus Fischer’s “Feudal Europe, 800–1300: Communal Discourse and Conºictual Practices,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 427–
466.

